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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous développons un modèle théorique dans lequel les individus sont motivés par la 
satisfaction égoïste que leur procure l’accumulation de biens, mais où le contrat social incite 
chaque individu à travailler pour les autres afin d’accroître le bien-être collectif. Nous 
introduisons une variable d’état représentant le stock de capital social, ou «  stock de 
coopération ». Nous démontrons que cette variable peut influencer les actions des agents non-
coopératifs. Les agents accumulent le stock de coopération de la société et réussisent  à règler 
de manière progressive le problème du passager clandestin pour un jeu de contributions 
privées dans un bien public. Nous supposons qu’il n’existe pas de stratégies de pénalité, de 
sentiment de culpabilité chez les individus et que chaque agent est rationnel. 
 




We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated 
by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit 
social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the 
satisfaction of all. We introduce a state variable that acts as a proxy for social capital of 
trustworthiness and that we call the stock of cooperation. We show that noncooperative 
agents might condition their action on this state variable. Agents build-up the society's stock 
of cooperation and gradually overcome the free riding problem in a game of private 
contribution to a public good. We assume that there are neither penalties in the sense of 
trigger strategies, nor guilt and that each individual is rational. 
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According to Arrow (1972, 1974) the role of trust in economic behavior cannot be
exaggerated. He pointed out that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself
an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by
lack of mutual conﬁdence” (Arrow, 1972, p 357). Subsequent to Arrow’s pioneering work, a
number of authors have developed theoretical, empirical, and experimental models to address
the importance of trust and reciprocity in economic life.
Experimental studies of trust indicate that certain behavior is based on trust even when
all agents face one-shot games. Berg, Dickhaut and McKabe (1995, p. 123) reported the
following experiment. “Subjects in room A decide how much of their $10 show-up fee to
s e n dt oa na n o n y m o u sc o u n t e r p a r ti nr o o mB .S u b j e c t sw e r ei n f o r m e dt h a te a c hd o l l a rs e n t
would triple by the time it reaches room B. Subjects in room B then decide how much of
the tripled money to keep and how much to send back to their respective counterparts. The
unique Nash equilibrium prediction for this game is to send zero money. This prediction is
rejected in our ﬁrst (no history) treatment where 30 of 32 room A subjects sent money.”
They also reported that room B subjects do reciprocate1.
Zak and Knack (2001) build a general equilibrium growth model where agents are het-
erogeneous and face a moral hazard problem. In each period, to access the capital market
consumers must use the service of investment brokers who have more information about
the return on investment than their clients. Consumers choose the extent to which they
trust their broker by choosing the amount of spending on veriﬁcation of their broker’s trust-
worthiness. The authors show that trust is linked to social, economic and institutional
environments and that there exists a "low-trust poverty trap". In societies where trust is
low, savings cannot sustain positive output growth. Their results are supported by an em-
pirical investigation of a cross-section of countries. The model provides an explanation of
1A double-blind procedure was used to guarantee complete anonimity with respect to other subjects and
the experimentor. (p.127.)
2the empirical ﬁnding of Knack and Keefer (1997) that higher trust is conducive to growth
for a sample of 29 market economies.
Trust and reciprocity are as important facts of economic life as the price system. Volun-
tary donations to a blood bank, for example, could be explained in terms of trust. Richard
Titmuss (1971, p. 239) argued that “in not asking for or expecting any payment of money,
these donors signify their belief in the willingness of other men to act altruistically in the
future, and to combine together to make a gift freely available should they have a need for
it. By expressing conﬁdence in the behavior of future unknown strangers, they were denying
the Hobbesian thesis that men are devoid of any distinctive moral sense.”
In trying to explain the motives of blood donors and other gift givers, Arrow (1972, p.
348) advanced three alternative hypotheses:
(H1) The welfare of each individual depends positively on his own satisfaction, and on the
satisfactions obtained by others.
(H2) The welfare of each individual depends not only on the utilities of himself and others,
but also on his contributions to the utilities of others.
(H3) Each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction
derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that
each performs duties for the other in a way calculated to enhance the satisfaction of all.
It has often been pointed out that a methodological problem with hypotheses (1) and
(2) is that it is “too easy” to explain a behavior by assuming that such behavior contributes
directly to utility. For this reason, it is the third hypothesis that interests us most, and
this paper formulates a theoretical model that elaborates on the idea that self-interested
individuals have an incentive to “do good”, provided that they see this incentive in other
equally self-interested individuals with whom they interact.
There are two important issues concerning hypothesis H3. First, what is the origin of
such tacit social contracts? Second, how are such contracts carried out? In this paper, we
are not addressing the ﬁrst issue, though it is worthwhile to note in passing that Arrow
(1972, p. 349) did mention the evolutionary mechanism, which, as he pointed out, had been
discussed in Kropotkin (1902) and Wynne-Edwards (1962). According to the evolutionary
3view, trust emerges because it maximizes genetic ﬁtness. See also more recent work by Güth
et al.(1993), and Cosmides and Tooby (1992). Altruism, for example, might be propagated
by genes (Dawkins, 1976) or by “meme”, a controversial concept introduced by Dawkins
(1986).
Kurzban and Houser (2004) conduct an experimental investigation of cooperative types
in humans in a public goods game. Their ﬁndings support the existence of three types of
subjects: cooperative, non-cooperative and reciprocal types who condition their contribution
to the public good on beliefs about others’ contribution. However, the authors point out
that they "remain agnostic with respect to the very important issue of the correct ultimate
explanation for the existence of cooperative types, and how cooperative strategies are sta-
bilized." The authors suggest punishment and the possibility of non participation as two
promising directions to answer how cooperation in groups might have evolved. In this paper
we oer an alternative answer to the question of the stability or sustainability of cooperative
strategies.2
Our purpose is to present a theoretical model showing how behavior based on trust can
be self-sustaining: if each agent believes that other agents will "do good", it is in this agent’s
best interest to "do good" and adopt a "cooperative" behavior. Note that this is in contrast
with approaches that explain cooperation by example-setting behavior, where an agent "does
good" to induce the other agents to "do good". In the model presented here, the causality
is reversed: given a "cooperative" behavior of the other agents, an agent chooses to adopt
a "cooperative" behavior. This is consistent with the experimental ﬁndings in Kurzban and
Houser (2004) where the majority type is the reciprocal type. In their experiment the agent
is given a chance to revise his contribution to the public good after getting the information.
It is important to point out that we do not rely on repeated games with trigger strategies
and punishment by reverting to the one-shot non-cooperative equilibrium, nor on reputation
2Kosfeld et al. (2005) give an alternative biological explanation of trust among humans: they established
a link between the level of trust and the level of oxytocin, a neuropetide that was shown to play a key role in
positive social interactions among non-human mammals. They study the eect of intranasal administration
of oxytocin on individual’s decisions in a trust game. The experiments show that oxytocin increases the
investors’ trusting behavior, although it does not appear to have an impact on the trustees’ behavior.
4building in a sequence of games (Kreps, 1990). Instead we model the conditioning of behavior
on a “social history” of trust or cooperation. In general, a social history need not be the
history of plays of current players. It is possible that a history of behavior of past players
(who have exited the game) may inﬂuence the behavior of new players3. It has been observed
that, in experiments, the provision of social history of past players does inﬂuence the behavior
of current players (Berg et al., 1995, section 4).
Instead of a complicated social history that records the behavior of each agent at all
points of time, we postulate a very simple social history that we call the stock of cooperation.
It is simply a rough indicator of past behavior. We suppose that the stock of cooperation
builds up when agents "behave cooperatively" and that it is subject to “decay” (people easily
forget things that happened a long time ago). We assume that there are no penalties in the
sense of trigger strategies, nor guilt.
Technically, in our model a social history of trustworthiness or the stock of cooperation
is a state variable that is subject to decay. We show that noncooperative agents might
condition their action on this state variable, and gradually (and partially) overcome the free
riding problem in a game of private contribution to a public good. An implication of our
model is that two societies with identical endowments, preferences and technology may end
up with two dierent levels of public good (and welfare), if in one society agents condition
their action on the intangible stock of cooperation, and build up the stock, while agents in
the other society disregard the possible relevance of such a stock. Both sets of agents are
rational, and coordination in the ﬁrst society is only tacit.
We consider a repeated game of contribution to a public good. As expected, the constant
contribution level (that of a static Nash equilibrium) constitutes a Nash equilibrium level
of contributions of the inﬁnitely repeated game. A novel feature of our model is, without
resorting to trigger strategies, the existence of a continuum of contribution levels that can
be sustained as the steady state of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE). These
equilibria exhibit two important features. First, we show that the highest sustainable level
3A related concept is social norms, which we do not model here. Violations of norms result in sanctions,
which can be external (ostracism) or internal (guilt).
5of contribution is strictly between the constant contribution level of a static Nash equilibrium
and the socially optimal contribution level. Second, the contribution level of the repeated
static game changes over time. Agents gradually adjust their contributions, and eventually
achieve a (steady state) sustainable level. These two features contrast with the properties
of the equilibria obtained in the repeated game literature, where agents can use strategies
that allow for punishment. In that literature it is shown that (i) dierent contribution
levels, including the socially desirable contribution level, can be sustained when agents use
trigger strategies and (ii) the equilibrium outcome is such that level of contribution to the
public good is constant. The dynamics of trust in an a priori stationary environment or the
gradual building of cooperation through time that we show, is an important contribution
of this paper. Other models that generates a dynamic of cooperation typically require the
existence of at least two types of agents, a cooperative agent and a selﬁsh agent,where
the proportion of agents’ type follows an evolutionary process described by a reciprocator
dynamics. For example Carpenter (2004) presents a model where agents can either choose
a cooperative level of contribution to a public goods game or a level that corresponds to
a free rider’s contribution. The proportion of free riders is assumed to follow a replicator
dynamics and in the long-run all the population becomes free riders. This prediction is
partially supported by the results of some laboratory experiments on public goods games
(see e.g. Friedman (1996), Carpenter and Matthews (2005), Ledyard (1995), Miller and
Andreoni (1991)). Carpenter (2004) shows that conformity increases the growth rate of free
riding. In our model agents are homogenous and all selﬁsh. The equilibria exhibited in our
paper also have the following feature observed in experiments: starting from high levels of
cooperation, the level of cooperation will decrease over time to a steady state level, as agents
interact. On the other hand starting from low levels of cooperation the level of cooperation
will increase to its steady state level.
Before proceeding, we would like to draw attention to a related literature on dynamic
contribution to public goods. This literature assumes that there is a growing physical stock
of public good that enters the utility function. Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) modelled public
good as a stock that grows with additional contributions. They assumed agents condition
6their additional contributions on the current level of the stock of the public good. They
showed that the free riding problem is worse, compared with the case where agents are
able to commit to a time path of contributions. Wirl (1996) showed that if non-linear
strategies are admitted, then the outcome can be better than that predicted by Fershtman
and Nitzan. Itaya and Shimomura (2001) obtained results similar to that of Wirl, but in
a more general setting. Marx and Matthews (2000) introduced imperfect information and
focussed on Baysesian equilibria. In all these models, the public good is a stock that grows
over time. In contrast, we model the public good as a ﬂow, so that the only stock is the
intangible stock of cooperation (which does not exist in the models mentioned above). In
dierential game theory it is well established that even linear quadratic games may admit
a continuum of non-linear equilibrium strategies. This was shown in a dynamic oligopoly
competition with sticky prices (Tsutsui and Mino (1990)) and in a transboundary pollution
game (Dockner and Long (1993)). In these models however the state variable entered directly
in the utility of each agent. In our model, this intangible stock is of “no intrinsic value” in
that it does not enter the utility function nor the production function.
Two questions could be raised: why would agents condition their behavior on an in-
tangible stock of social history of cooperation, and not on any other variable, such as the
weather? And how do people coordinate such conditionning? While these questions are
beyond the scope of this paper, we would like to note that perhaps, in determining what is
a relevant variable, education and culture play a role. As argued in Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001), the behavioral patterns of children are acquired through an adaptation and imitation
process which depends on their parents’ socialization actions, and on the cultural and social
environment in which children live. Carpenter et al. (2004) conduct ﬁeld experiments in
urban slums in Viet Nam and Thailand and measure the impact of demographic factors on
trust and cooperation. In both countries the contribution level to a voluntary contribution
game is high. However, they ﬁnd that the correlations of trust to many demographic and
associational factors dier signiﬁcantly across the two countries, evidence of the important
role of culture.
72 The Model
There are two ﬁnal goods: a private good, and a public good, the supply of which
is denoted by J= (Here J is a ﬂow, not a stock.) Both goods are produced using labor
(measured in unit of eort). Examples of private contributions to a public good include dyke
maintenance, charity, monitoring and denouncing corrupt behavior of government o!cials,
etc. There are q identical agents. If agent l contributes jl units of labor as input to the
public good, he is left with {l = {(jl) units of private good. The function {(jl) can be
thought of as the upper boundary of the individual’s production possibilities set. Assume
{0(jl) ? 0 for all jl  0. The maximum amount of private goods that an individual can
produce depends negatively on his contribution to public good. We do not impose further
restrictions on {(j) in order to simplify the exposition.
Each person has the utility function
xl = X(J>{l)
where J is the quantity of the public good. Assume XJ A 0 and X{ A 0.
Let J3l denote the total contribution of all agents other than agent l.T h e n
J = J3l + jl
In this model, there is no physical stock of productive input.(This assumption is made so
that we can focus on the role of “social trust” or the stock of cooperation which is modelled
as a stock, with its own law of motion.)
Individuals live for ever. Agent l (l =1 >2==>q) maximizes his life-time utility, as described
below.
PROBLEM S1





82.1 Static Nash equilibrium
Suppose agent l believes that J3l(w)=J3l (a positive constant). Then the solution of
PROBLEM S1
l is to set jl(w)=jl,w h e r ejl maximizes
X(jl + J3l>{(jl))
We assume an interior optimum for agent l’s problem. Then jl satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition:
XJ(jl + J3l>{(jl)) + X{(jl + J3l>{(jl)){
0(jl)=0 (1)
We assume that the following second order condition is satisﬁed




00 ? 0 (2)
All the functions (XJJ>X J{>X {{>{ 0 and {00) in condition (2) are evaluated at the interior
equilibrium.
The ﬁrst order condition deﬁnes the reaction function
jl = U(J3l)










This slope is negative if the term inside the square bracket is negative. (In that case, jl is
said to be a strategic substitute for J3l). It is useful, though not essential, to assume the
strategic substitute property:
9Assumption A: (Strategic substitutes)
We assume that X and { are such that
XJJ + {
0X{J ? 0 for all j  0




This equilibrium is characterized by the equality between each individual’s marginal rate of







Clearly, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium if the function {0(j) is upward
sloping, with {0(0) = 0 and the function XJ(qjQ>{(jQ))@X{(qjQ>{(jQ)) is downward slop-
i n g( as u !cient set of conditions for this is X{J  0, XJJ  0 and X{{  0.)
Under standard assumptions, it is well known that the symmetric static Nash equilib-
rium implies the underprovision of the public good (as compared to the social optimum)4.
The social optimum is obtained by maximizing the utility of the representative individual
with respect to j :
max
j X(qj>{(j))









This condition yields the well-known Samuelsonian rule, namely the MRT must be equated
4See, for example, Cornes and Sandler (1986).








We show in Appendix 1 that, under Assumption A5, the social optimum jvr exceeds jQ.
2.2 Introducing the stock of cooperation
L e tu sn o wi n t r o d u c eas t a t ev a r i a b l eV(w) which is a summary of the social history and
that we call the stock of cooperation. We assume that the rate of change of the variable V(w)
is given by
˙ V(w)=J(w)  qj
Q  V(w) (5)
where A0 is the rate of decay of the stock of cooperation. It follows that if V(0) = 0 and
J(w)=qjQ always, then V(w) will remain zero: no social capital is built-up. On the other
hand, as soon as J(w) exceeds qjQ, V(w) will become positive. Starting with V(0) = 0,i f
agents never contribute less than the static Nash equilibrium level, V(w) will never become
negative. When all agents contribute to the public good at the socially desirable rate jvr
the resulting steady-state stock of cooperation is Vvr
" = q
jvr3jQ
 A 0. W en o t et h a ti ft h e
game starts with a large level of cooperation stock V0,t h e ne v e ni fJ(w)qjQ A 0 the stock
of cooperation may decrease. This is consistent with observations from in experiments that
the provision of social history of past players does inﬂuence the behavior of current players
(Berg et al., 1995, section 4) and that when the level of cooperation at the beginning of
experiments can be ‘high’, it diminishes as the experiment proceeds (Ledyard (1995) and
the citations therein, see also Fehr and Gächter (2000)).
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h ev a r i a b l eV(w) is not an argument of the utility function
X (recall that X depends only on J and {). Nor is V(w) a stock from which a good (public
or private) can be extracted. So, we say V(w) has “no intrinsic value”. We assume that the
5Assumption A is satisﬁed, for example, when XJJ ? 0, XJ{  0 and {0 ? 0.
11law of motion (5) is known to all individuals. They can observe the current J(w).
Even though it has no intrinsic value, we argue below that V(w) can indirectly inﬂuence
welfare of individuals, if each individual l believes that all other individuals m 5 Q follow
a “rule of behavior” that conditions their public good contribution jm(w) on the level of the
stock of cooperation V(w):
jm(w)=!m(V(w)) for m 6= l (6)
Consider the problem facing individual l if all agents m 6= l adopt behavior rules of the
type speciﬁed in equation (6). For simplicity, assume
!m(V)=e !(V) for all m 6= l
Given this rule of behavior, it follows that
J3l(w)=pe !(V(w)) where p = q  1
Thus individual l faces a standard optimal control problem involving a single state variable,









˙ V = jl + pe !(V)  qj
Q  V with V(0) = 0= (7)
Since this is an autonomous problem (i.e. time appears explicitly only in the term h3uw)
and since the time horizon is inﬁnite, the solution of this problem can be represented in the
feedback form with jl(w)=!l(V(w)). The set of strategies we consider is the set of Markovian
strategies. A Markovian Nash equilibrium is a proﬁle of Markovian strategies, one for each
player, that are best replies to each others.
We seek to characterize Markovian Nash equilibria for this dierential game which
12involves q players. This can be done either by using either the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation, or by solving the optimal control problem of the representative agent, and appealing
to symmetry. We adopt the second approach, and show in Appendix 2 that each solution




pXJ + pI(!(V)) + I0(!(V))(q!(V)  qjQ  V)
(8)
where
I(!(V)) = XJ(q!(V)>{(!(V)))  X{(q!(V)>{(!(V))){
0(!(V))
represents a potential Markovian Nash equilibrium strategy. Any solution of (8) for which
the transversality condition of the optimal control problem S2
l (equation (23) in Appendix
2) is met qualiﬁes as a symmetric Markovian Nash equilibrium. Suppose V(w) remains ﬁnite,
and X is bounded, then if !(V) is such that
lim
w<"V(w)=V
for some ﬁnite VA0, one can easily verify that the transversality condition is satisﬁed.
Lemma 1: The static Nash equilibrium (found in the preceding subsection) is a Markov-
ian Nash equilibrium of the dierential game. At that equilibrium,
!(V)=j
Q for all V  0









Remark: We would like to point out that while we allow players to condition their
action on the level V, choosing a strategy that does not depend V is admissible. In particular,
it is feasible to choose the equilibrium constant level of contribution jQ of the non-cooperative
static game. The idea of allowing agents to condition on V reﬂects the fact that in repeated
13transactions the level of past cooperation may induce higher trust among agents and a more
cooperative behaviour of others. For instance, it is customary in business that acceptable
payment methods for long time customers are dierent and more accommodating than for a
new customer (e.g. accepting personal checks or debt acknowledgement instead of requiring
certiﬁed checks or cash). Similarly, the practice of credit ratings used by loan companies
is an example where the main information that matters is the past payment behaviour of
a customer, over a certain period of time. The credit history is then summarised by a
state variable, i.e. the credit rating. In public good games, there are numerous laboratory
experiments that support the prevalence of (partial) cooperation even in one shot games,
where the use of punishment is not feasible. The main assumption that we impose in our
paper is that the perceived indicator of cooperation and its dynamics as described by equation
(5) is the same for all agents. This assumption is made for tractability. We believe that
equilibria where agents do condition their actions on their perceived level of cooperation
would still exist if each agent had a speciﬁc indicator of cooperation with its own dynamics.
Our speciﬁcation of the dynamics, i.e. equation (5), of the perceived indicator of co-
operation is by no means the only one that would produce the desirable outcome. Here we
have assumed that the baseline expectation of an agent is jQ and any contribution above
jQ builds up the indicator of cooperation. Alternatively, we could have used a dierent
baseline such as jvr and have the indicator decrease when the level of contribution is below
jvr. One can also consider a more sophisticated natural decay of the stock of cooperation.
T h ee s s e n t i a lp o i n ti st h a ta n yd y n a m i cs p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n ,s u c ha se q u a t i o n( 5 ) ,s h o u l de x h i b i t
two simple features: there exists a perceived level of trust or cooperative behavior by agents
if they observe a level of public goods dierent from the noncooperative level, this perception
of cooperation is enhanced the higher the contributions to the public good. Speciﬁcations
such as equation (5) are supported by results from laboratory experiments of trust games
and games of public goods which show that in repeated interactions, as the contributions
fall below the cooperative level trust among agents decreases.
Measuring the initial stock of cooperation V and other parameters of the dierential
equation that describes its dynamics (5), in particular the rate of decay , is a critical
14issue in empirical applications of this model. Although we do not address this question we
would like to mention the existence of surveys that have been used to measure trust between
individuals. For example Zak and Knack (2001) use a measure based on data from the World
Values Survey (WVS) conducted in three periods (1981, 1990-1 and 1995-6) in several dozen
countries (Inglehart et al. 2000). The measure of trust used by Zak and Knack (2001) is the
percentage of respondents in a given country that stated that ‘most people can be trusted’
against those who stated the alternative, ‘you can’t be too careful in dealing with people’.
We believe that a similar measure of the stock of cooperation can be used, and the data from
several years can be used to measure the rate of decay of the stock of cooperation or trust.
For certain public goods of a specialized nature, potential contributors are given information
about the aggregate history of cooperations. For example, the website wikipedia.org (the
25th most popular website in the world) publishes statistics about daily ﬁnancial donations
(of mostly anonymous donors) to wikipedia, and statistics about recent additions/changes to
articles (all of which are by anonymous contributors) to the spread of encyclopedic knowledge.
Similarly, alumni of many universities are provided with information about the outcomes of
fund raising eorts of previous years. These provide some proxy measures of the stock of
cooperation for a given community.
We now investigate the existence of non-constant Markovian Nash equilibria.






pXJ(qj>{(j)) + pI(j)+I0(j)(qj  qjQ  V)
(9)
We can trace the integral curves of this ﬁrst order dierential equation in a diagram with
V along the horizontal axis and j along the vertical axis. In the diagram, we draw the line
j = jQ +(V@q). Along this line, ˙ V =0 . The intersection of this line with an integral curve
of the ﬁrst order dierential equation (9) yields a potential steady state. We are particularly
interested in ﬁnding the integral curves j = !(V) that cut this line from above (to ensure
15stability of the steady state), i.e. we want q!0(V) ? .A tt h ep o i n tw h e r et h ec u r v ej = !(V)
cuts the curve j = jQ +( V@q),w eh a v e ˙ V =0 , hence
!
0(V)=
(u + ){XJ  X{{0}
pXJ(qj>{(j)) + pI(j)
=













Note that if we evaluate the right hand side of (10) at j = jQ, we obtain zero, which
means that !(V) is a horizontal line. This is the static Nash equilibrium. If we evaluate the










0(V)=( u + )(q  1)@p = u + A
which implies instability of the steady state; i.e. the stock of cooperation is not bounded.
We thus obtain the following impossibility result:
Lemma 2: The socially optimal level of contribution to the public, jvr,c a n n o tb e
supported as a stable steady state level of contribution of a Markovian Nash equilibrium.
We would like to point out that this result contrasts with the result obtained for standard
repeated games with the use of punishment strategies of the trigger type. When trigger
punishment strategies are allowed it is well known in the repeated games literature that the
socially desirable level of contributions to the public good can be sustained as the outcome of
a Nash equilibrium. In our case although the level of contributions to the public good can be
larger than the contributions under a "myopic" static Nash equilibrium jQ,t h em a x i m u m
steady-state level of contributions to the public good is some number jW that is strictly
smaller than jvr. This is because we restrict the permissible strategies to a set that does not
16involve the switching to a triggered punishment mode in case any deviation is observed6.
Therefore jvr cannot be sustained as a stable steady of our dierential game.
Although the socially optimum level of contribution to the public good cannot be sup-
ported in the long-run, we can state the following
Proposition 1: There exists jW 5 (jQ>jvr) such that any level of the contributions to
t h ep u b l i cg o o dj 5 [jQ>j W) can be sustained as the stable steady state level of contributions
to the public good of a Markovian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: This follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and the fact the solutions to the ﬁrst
order dierential equation (9) is a continuum. Through each point on the segment LV>in the
(V>j) space, joining the two points
¡
0>jQ¢
and (Vvr>j vr) where Vvr =
jvr3jQ
@q , passes one and
only one integral curve of the dierential equation (9). Moreover, since
XJ
X{{0 is a continuous
function of j, we can state that the slope of the integral curves at their intersection with







, varies continuously from !0(0) ? 
q to
!0(Vvr) A 
q. Therefore there exists a unique point (jW>VW) on the segment LV such that
the integral curve to the dierential equation that cuts the segment LV at (jW>VW) has slope
exactly equal to 
q at (jW>VW). Moreover each element of the continuum of integral curves
to the dierential equation (9) that cut the segment LV at j 5 [jQ>jW) has a slope that is
strictly smaller than 
q (i.e. the stability condition (10) is satisﬁed) at its intersection with
the segment LV. Therefore each of these integral curves characterize a MPNE strategy and
any level of the contributions to the public good j 5 [jQ>j W) can be sustained as the stable
steady state level of contributions to the public good of a Markovian Nash equilibrium
The existence of a continuum of non-linear equilibria in dierential games was shown
in a dynamic oligopoly competition with sticky prices (Tsutsui and Mino, 1990) and in a
transboundary pollution game (Dockner and Long, 1993). In contrast with the model at
hand, in these models the state variable entered directly in the utility of each agent. We
would like to point out that, as in Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and Long (1993),
each equilibrium strategy that can support a steady state level of contributions jW 5 (jQ>j vr)
6For a discussion of strategies that allow for the use of threats in dierential games see Dockner et al.
(2000, Chapter 6).
17is only locally deﬁned. Note that while Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and Long
(1993) use a linear quadratic model, our Proposition 1 is established without assuming
that the utility function is quadratic. Also, Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and
Long (1993), use a dynamic programing approach to characterize the equilibria, here we
use the maximum principle and exploit the fact that problem is autonomous to express the
controls and the co-state variables in a feedback form. Many authors have used the maximum
principle approach to obtain Markovian equilibria of dierential games (see, for examples,
Tornell and Lane, 1999, Tornell and Velasco, 1992).
Another important feature of the equilibria we exhibit is that the contribution to the
public good is not constant along the equilibrium path. Agents gradually and smoothly
adjust their contribution as the stock of cooperation converges to its steady state level. This
also contrasts with the outcome of a repeated game where agents are allowed to use strategies
that allow for punishments. That setup does not generate a dynamics of the actions played
along an equilibrium, unless one introduces imperfect information and learning about some
characteristics of the game as it unfolds (as in Marx and Matthews, 2000). In our model
agents are informed about the characteristics of the game and in particular the strategies
played by the other agents, yet the level of contribution, and the stock of cooperation, can
increase gradually and only through the actions taken over time.
3 Complete analytical solution
We now specify functional forms so that a complete analytical characterization of the
equilibria is possible. In particular we characterize a continuum of Markovian Nash equilibria
with non-linear strategies !(V) that lead to a steady state where everyone contributes more
than their static Nash equilibrium contribution level to the public good. We also show that
if the discount rate u is small enough then it is possible to achieve approximately the social
optimum.





where HA0 is a constant. (At this stage we do not specify whether z is negative or




where \A 0 and fA0=















Thus the social optimum contribution exceeds the static Nash contribution.





[(f  zq)j  H](u + )





Let us plot the integral curves of this ﬁrst order dierential equation on the plane (V>j).
Since the numerator is
W(j)=[ ( f  zq)j  H](u + )
we know that W(j) A 0 if jAj Q,a n dW(j) ? 0 if j?j Q. The denominator is
G(j>V)=pfj +( f  zq)(qj  qj
Q  V)
19Thus G(j>V)=pfj A 0 for jA0 along the (possible steady state) line j = jQ +( @q)V









which is below the line j = jQ +( @q)V for all V  0.( S e eF i g u r e1 ) .
Thus the horizontal line j = jQ and the line UU divide the positive orthant into four regions,
w h i c hw el a b e lc l o c k w i s ea sr e g i o n sL, LL, LLL, LY,w h e r er e g i o n sL and LL are above the
line UU. The steady state line j = jQ +( @q)V lies inside region LL.
Integral curves are positively sloped in regions LL and LY and negatively sloped in regions L
and LLL. There exists a unique integral curve that is tangent to the possible steady state line
VV and jW denotes the vertical coordinate of the tangency point. There is a continuum of
integral curves in region LL that cut the steady state line j = jQ +(@q)V from above. (See
Figure 1). Each of these integral curves represents a Markovian Nash equilibrium strategy
that leads to a stable steady state level of contributions to the public good that belongs to
the interval [jQ>jW).
There are no linear strategies that lead to a steady state, apart from the constant strategy
!(V)=jQ.
3.2 An analytical characterization
We solve the dierential equation (12). Let us consider the inverse of the function !(V)
and interpret (12) as a dierential equation characterizing V (j). We obtain the following




(pf +( f  zq)q)j  (f  zq)V  (f  zq)qjQ
[(f  zq)j  H](u + )
(13)
20Let d = 
(u+) >e=
(pf+(f3zq)q)
(u+)(f3zq) ,E = pf
(u+)(f3zq)and } = j  jQ. The equation (13) can be



















For each N> (15) deﬁnes an implicit relationship between } (or j)a n dV= (Note: for N =0







+ N(j  j
Q)
3d (16)
For N?0,a n djAj Q, VN(j) is a strictly concave and increasing function, with limj<jQVN(j)=
4 and limj<"VN(j)=4.F o rNA0,a n djAj Q, VN(j) is a strictly convex function,
with limj<jQVN(j)=+ 4 and limj<"VN(j)=+ 4. Furthermore, limj<jQV0
N(j)=4
and limj<"V0
N(j)=e@(1 + d). We must determine whether the curve VN(j) intersects the
curve V = q(j  jQ)@ for jAj Q. If an intersection exists, it is a steady state.

































The left-hand side of (17) is linear and decreasing in b V and is positive for b V 5 (0>EjQ@(d)
and negative for b VAE j Q@(d) A 0. There are three cases: NA0>N =0and N?0= It
can be shown that for NA0 and N =0the stability condition is not satisﬁed.
For any N?0, the right-hand side of (17) is a positive, convex, and decreasing function of
21b V for all b VA0= It follows that if the absolute value of N is not too large, the convex curve
must intersect the downward sloping straight-line that represents the left-hand side of (17)









It is clear that VO
N is locally stable and VK
N is unstable. This is because the function VN(j)
is concave, and thus the curve representing it in the space (j>V) (with j measured along the
horizontal axis) cuts the line V = q(j  jQ)@ from below at the point VO
N and from above
at the point VK
N.
There is a critical value of N, denoted by NW such that for all N smaller (larger in
absolute value) than NW the convex and decreasing curve that represents the right-hand side
of (17) does not intersect the downward sloping straight-line that represents the left-hand
side of (17). If N = NW,w eh a v eVK
NW = VO
NW> that is, the steady state is unique. We will
denote this unique steady state by b VNW.L e tjW = jQ +( @q)b VNW be the associated steady
state level of contribution to the public good. We show in Appendix 4 that the critical value

















Proposition 1b: Let jW = jQ +
EjQ
q(3)(1+d).W e h a v ejW ?j vr and any level of the
contributions to the public good j 5 [jQ>j W) can be sustained as the stable steady state level
of contributions to the public good of a Markovian Nash equilibrium.
Substituting jW and jQ gives
jQ
jW =
q(u +2 )(f  zq)  [p +( f  zq)q]
q(u +2 )(f  zq)  [p +( f  zq)q]+pf






qf  zq2 =
f  zq2
qf  zq2










Thus, we have proved:
Proposition 2:
If the rate of discount u is close enough to zero, then it is possible to approximate the social
optimum.
To summarize, there is maximum level of contribution to the public good jW (and a
corresponding stock of cooperation b VNW) that can be supported as the steady state level
of contribution to the public good a Markovian Nash equilibrium. Although jW is smaller
than the socially optimal level of contributions to the public good jvr (and b VNW ?V vr)i ti s
larger than jQ>the contribution to the public good under the static Nash equilibrium (and
b VNW AV Q =0 ).
The steady state level of contribution to the public good jW is supported by a Markovian
Nash equilibrium where the equilibrium contribution strategy is an increasing function of
the stock of cooperation. When agent l takes the contribution of agent m 6= l as given, he can
still inﬂuence the amount contributed at each moment by agent m by inﬂuencing the stock
of cooperation. This feedback eect increases the marginal beneﬁt of the contribution to
the public good and the resulting equilibrium level of contributions exceeds the contribution
level under the static Nash equilibrium where the feedback eect is absent.
We have shown the existence of a stable steady state level of cooperation V in the
case for all negative N such that NW ?N?0. While the value of NW (corresponding
to the ‘most cooperative’ equilibrium) depends on parameters of the model, the selection
23of a particular level of N may not depend on the model parameters. The existence of a
continuum of equilibria can be naturally followed up by a discussion of the selection process
of an equilibrium among the continuum of equilibria. The selection of a speciﬁc equilibrium
amounts to the selection of a speciﬁc value of N. This process is not described in our paper.
It can be for example determined in a pre-play phase where agents have cheap talks and
agree on a level of N= An alternative device to induce agents to condition their actions on the
level of cooperation is the existence and participation of a third party such as government
agency or regulator that conditions its actions on the level of the stock of cooperation and
announces a speciﬁc value of N. Note that for a given negative N in (NW>0) the stock of
cooperation converges to a positive steady level even when the initial stock of cooperation is
zero. This is because at time zero the equilibrium initial level of contribution is above the
non-cooperative level which initiates the build up process of cooperation.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have shown that if each individual in a society expects that other individuals use
a behavior rule that conditions their public good contribution on the level of trust or the
stock of cooperation in the society, then he will have an incentive to build up the stock of
cooperation. This can result in behavior rules that lead to a superior performance in terms
of welfare. However it is only when the rate of discount tends to zero that the steady state
of this game can approximate what a social planner would want to achieve.
Our model serves to concretize Arrow’s third hypothesis, that each individual is, in some
ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to
him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the other in
a way calculated to enhance the satisfaction of all.
It is important to note that in our model the variable that represents social history is
not an argument of the utility function nor is it a stock from which a good (public or private)
can be extracted. In fact, this variable has “no intrinsic value”. A remarkable feature of our
model is that a variable of no intrinsic value can inﬂuence behavior and improve welfare even
24when individuals do not resort to trigger strategies. Formally, this can happen for example
when agents hold cheap talks prior to the start of the game and agree on the self-enforcing
equilibrium strategy (uniquely deﬁned by a given value of N) that will be followed. The main
conditions that need to be met are that N is in (NW>0) and that initial stock of cooperation
is not too high since the non-linear equilibria are not deﬁned globally.
25Appendix 1
Comparing the Samuelsonian rule with the Nash equilibrium condition (3), we can see that,
if (XJJ + XJ{{0)(k  1) + M?0 for all k 5 [1>q], the Nash equilibrium level of private
provision of the public good is too low. To prove this, deﬁne the function
l(j>k)=kXJ(qj>{(j)) + X{(qj>{(j)){
0(j)
















= XJ A 0












=( k  1)(XJJ + XJ{{
0)+M
where M?0 by the second order condition, and XJJ+XJ{{0  0 under Assumption A. This
completes the proof. (Note that Assumption A is not a necessary condition for jvr to exceed
jQ.)









We use the maximum principle to characterize the solution to this problem. The Hamiltonian
function is
K = X(jl + pe !(V)>{(jl)) + 
h




where  is the costate variable associated with the stock of social environment.
The ﬁrst order condition from the maximization of K is:
XJ(jl + pe !(V)>{(jl)) + X{(jl + pe !(V)>{(jl)){
0(jl)+ =0 (20)





00(jl) ? 0 (21)




=( u +   pe !
0
(V))(w)  pe !
0
(V)XJ (22)




Since this is an autonomous problem (i.e. time appears explicitly only in the term h3uw)
and since the time horizon is inﬁnite, the solution of this problem can be represented in the
feedback form with (w)=W(V(w)) and jl(w)=!l(V(w)). The equations (20) and (22) may
be written as








=( u +   pe !
0
(V))
W(V)  pe !
0
(V)XJ (25)
We substitute the term gV
gw from (7). The term
gW(V)
gV is obtained by dierentiating equation
(24) with respect to V. We then substitute the result into the left-hand side of (25) and we






























Agent l takes e !(V) (and e !
0
(V)) as given; his problem consists of solving the ﬁrst order
dierential equation (26) to obtain !l(V).
We seek to characterize Markovian Nash equilibria for this dierential game which involves
q players. Restricting our attention to a symmetric equilibrium, we want to ﬁnd a function
!(V) such that when !l(V)=e !(V)=!(V) the equation (26) is satisﬁed.
Let us deﬁne
I(!(V)) = XJ(q!(V)>{(!(V)))  X{(q!(V)>{(!(V))){
0(!(V))









(u + )I(!(V))  pI(!(V))!
0(V)  pXJ!
0(V)




pXJ + pI(!(V)) + I0(!(V))(q!(V)  qjQ  V)
(27)
Appendix 3:




(pf +( f  zq)q)(j  jQ)+pfjQ
[(f  zq)j  H](u + )

(f  zq)V















(pf +( f  zq)q)
(j  jQ)(f  zq)(u + )
+
pfjQ
(j  jQ)(f  zq)(u + )
Substituting d = 
(u+) >e=
(pf+(f3zq)q)
(u+)(f3zq) ,E = pf
(u+)(f3zq)and } = j  jQ yields (14).
Appendix 4: derivation of NW> b VNW and jW




d +NW(jjQ)3d must be tangent
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